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Abstract 
This thesis examines the development of Soviet and American operational thought. It 
investigates the development of the Soviet operational paradigm during the early 1920s 
and follows further Soviet development into the 1980s. It then studies the US Army's 
development of the operational level and suggests reasons for the relatively late 
development of American operational thought. It goes on to establish the influence of 
Red Army operational thought and practice on the development, and nature of US Army 
doctrine. It does this by comparative analysis of the Soviet 1936 Provisional Field 
Regulations for the Red Army and the American 1993 Field Manual (FM) I 00-5 
Operations. 
The thesis concludes that the strategically defensive nature of American doctrine and 
the historically tactical emphasis of the US Anny slowed American recognition of the 
operational level, and its application, operational art. American recent historical 
experience also played a large part in this. A more significant conclusion is that Soviet, 
and especially Red Army doctrine and practice had a large impact on the formulation 
and eventual nature of American operational doctrine. American operational thought 
crystallised due to the threat of a major conflict against the Soviet Union and its allies in 
Europe during the Cold War. This was helped by the thorough study of Soviet historical 
and contemporary operational thought, by organisations and individuals both within and 
without the US Army. 
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Introduction 
The operational level of war is one of the most important concepts of military 
operations. It provides the critical linkage between strategy and tactics. It is applicable 
to the full range of military activities from high intensity combat to peace support 
operations. American recognition of the operational level of war developed in the early 
1980s. The United States (US) Army first officially encapsulated this when it published 
its FM I 00-5 Operations Field Manual (FM) in 1982. The concept of the operational 
level of war, and its application, operational art, have remained important in all 
American Army field manuals since the early 1980s and there are no signs that this is 
likely to change in the near future. 
The Soviet development of operational art was uruque. Soviet recognition of the 
operational level preceded American developments by some 40 years. It was based to a 
large extent on operational experience gained by the Tsarist Army in the First World 
War and the Red Army in the Russian Civil War. Thus when Soviet writers came to 
describe the operational phenomenon, they could call on first hand experience, along 
with a rich historical background. The Americans had only flirted with warfare at the 
operational level before the 1980s. 
The obvious question to be answered was why had the Americans missed the boat in 
terms of this concept? In other words, why had it taken the American Army almost 40 
years longer than the Soviets to come up with a clear doctrinal definition of the 
operational level? 
The American operational approach was similar in many regards to the Soviet approach. 
This was especially evident in the shared emphasis on manoeuvre warfare theory and 
especially deep operations. Yet there is little explanation in secondary works about the 
possible linkage between the Soviet and the American operational schools. 
The thesis aims to answer two key questions. The first is why is it that the US Army did 
not recognise the operational level of war and its application operational art? The 
second is how much did US Army operational doctrine borrow from Soviet operational 
thoughts and concepts. 
The initial chapters of this thesis will examine the development of Soviet operational 
thinking by looking at some of the key events that shaped the Red Army. They will also 
look at the contribution of some of the most important Soviet military theorists. The 
fourth chapter will provide a detailed examination of the 1936 Soviet Field Regulations. 
These regulations were a distillation of Red Army practical experience and careful 
thinking about the form and requirements of future war. Chapter five will examine the 
experience of the mobile group concept during the Great Patriotic War. This is 
important as it shows one of the concepts that would form the cornerstone of Red Army 
post-war doctrine. Chapters six and seven will show the further development of Red 
Army doctrine in the context of the Cold War. The lion's share of Chapter seven will 
look at some important Soviet operational war fighting techniques. An understanding of 
post-war Red Army doctrine is critical to understanding the main potential enemy that 
faced the US Army as it emerged, battered, from South East Asia. 
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Indeed, the nature of the enemy would to a large degree shape the development of 
American operational thought and doctrine. Thus, chapters eight and nine will examine 
the development of US Anny operational thought and doctrine. Chapter ten will look in 
detail at the 1993 FM 100-5 Operations. This manual represented the most complete 
American field manual that was concerned primarily with conventional combat 
operations. It retained much of the emphasis on deep operations and contained many 
elements of manoeuvre warfare theory. 
A much more detailed analysis of Soviet and American operational thought is contained 
in the penultimate chapter. This chapter looks in detail at the differences and similarities 
between the Soviet 1936 Provisional Field Regulations for the Red Army and the 
American Army 1993 FM 100-5 Operations manual. The chapter will compare and 
contrast Soviet and American deep operation and command and control theory. It will 
also examine the use of artillery and long-range fires and the use of turning movements, 
along with differing attitudes to the issue of combined arms. This comparison will show 
how American operational concepts were influenced by Soviet doctrine and practice. 
This work ends with a conclusion that will discuss the main findings. 
This thesis set out to answer two main questions. The American failure to codify the 
operational level of war prior to the 1980s was due to their recent experiences of war. It 
also appears that American recognition of the operational level was held back due to 
their strategically defensive posture during the Cold War. 
It is also clear from the research carried out on this project that the Red Army did have a 
large influence on American operational theory. This influence was conveyed directly 
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and indirectly. The Americans were forced to develop an operational concept due to the 
inherent nature of their potential enemy in Europe after World War Two, and especially 
during the Cold War. This forced the US Army to develop concepts of depth, both 
offensively and defensively which were critical to operational level warfare. The 
influence was also notable in the education of US Army officers in Soviet warfare 
theory during the early 1980s. 
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